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Abstract: 
This paper evaluates public support of private-sector research and development (R&D) through 
the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s), Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program. 
Based on alternative evaluation methods applicable to survey data and case studies, we conclude 
that there is ample evidence that the DoD’s SBIR Program is stimulating R&D as well as efforts 
to commercialize that would not otherwise have taken place. Further, the evidence shows the 
SBIR R&D does lead to commercialization, and the net social benefits associated with the 
program’s sponsored research are substantial. 
 small businesses | innovation | public/partnership | research & development | Keywords:
program evaluation | research partnerships | research policy 
Article: 
1. Introduction 
As greater attention is paid to public support of private-sector research and development (R&D) 
by participants in the innovation process, it becomes imperative for policy makers to offer an 
economic rationale for their support of public/private technology partnerships as well as to 
formulate and demonstrate means for evaluating such relationships. While scholars and policy 
makers have long debated the economic role of government in the innovation process and the 
importance of market failure as an element of that rationale, Baron (1998) has offered a focused 
rationale for the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program: “[T]he rational for SBIR 
is the same as the general argument for government R&D—positive externalities (meaning) 
social benefits exceeding private ones.” 
When market failure is the broad justification for public support of R&D performed in the 
private sector, the situation is not only one where social benefits exceed private benefits. As a 
consequence of the divergence of social benefits and costs there must be, absent support from the 
government, underinvestment in R&D from society’s perspective. The fact that social benefits 
exceed private benefits is not sufficient to establish underinvestment.1 Furthermore, if 
government wants to justify public support with an argument based on market failure, policy 
makers must establish that government failure would not prevent improving R&D performance 
with a proposed policy.2 
 
The government has at its disposal mechanisms to address market failure and hence, to overcome 
private-sector underinvestment in R&D.3 These mechanisms include creating and maintaining 
an economic environment conducive for innovation. Examples of such mechanisms include the 
patent system and the passage of the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 to encourage 
research joint ventures; tax incentives to stimulate innovative investments through, for example, 
the 1981 R&E tax credit and its periodic renewals; and direct public/private technology 
partnerships to subsidize R&D, with the SBIR Program being one of several such programs.4 
 
In addition to its important role in surmounting market failure, government should also be held 
accountable for its legislated policies. As Link and Scott (1998) point out, the concept of public 
accountability in the US traces at least to the early 1920s. But, the passage of the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 emphasized the social importance of performance 
accountability, especially in the areas of science and technology, and has brought accountability 
back to center stage. 
 
Our focus in this paper is on the SBIR Program. We do not debate the appropriateness of the 
government’s support of that program but take that as a historical given and turn directly to 
evaluating the program’s results.5 In Section 2, we briefly describe the SBIR Program, with 
particular emphasis on the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) SBIR Program. In Section 3, we 
outline our evaluation methodology and present our findings with an emphasis on the social 
returns associated with SBIR-funded research. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 4. 
 
2. An overview of the SBIR Program 
The SBIR Program began at the National Science Foundation in 1977.6 At that time, the goal of 
the program was to encourage small businesses—considered by many to be engines of 
innovation in the US economy—to participate in NSF-sponsored research, especially research 
that had commercial potential. Because of the early success of the program at NSF, Congress 
passed the Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982. The 1982 Act required all 
government departments and agencies with external research programs of greater than US$ 100 
billion to establish their own SBIR Program and to set aside funds equal to 0.2% of their external 
research budget.7 
 
The 1982 Act states the following objectives of the program: 
 
1. To stimulate technological innovation. 
2. To use small business to meet Federal research and development needs. 
3. To foster and encourage participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in technological 
innovation. 
4. To increase private sector commercialization of innovations derived from federal research and 
development. 
In 1987, the funding percentage increased to 1.25%. The Act was later reauthorized by the Small 
Business Innovation Research Program Reauthorization Act of 1992, and the funding percentage 
increased to 1.5%. Since 1997, agencies have set aside 2.5% of their external research budgets 
for SBIR. 
Justification for the reauthorization, as stated in the 1992 Act, was that the program: 
 
… has effectively stimulated the commercialization of technology development through 
federal research and development, benefiting both the public and private sectors of the 
Nation. 
 
Clearly, given the complete list of stated objectives of the program dating from the 1982 Act, its 
rationale would be broader than the objective of correcting the market failure of underinvestment 
in R&D. In addition to addressing underinvestment in R&D, the SBIR Program has as well the 
goal of promoting diversity per se in the population of firms doing R&D.8 Here, we focus on the 
market failure, underinvestment justification for the SBIR Program. 
The DoD’s SBIR Program solicits proposals from eligible small businesses twice a year, and the 
awards are of three types.10 Phase I awards are relatively small, generally less than US$ 
100,000. The purpose of these awards is to help firms assess the feasibility of the research they 
propose to undertake for the agency in response to the agency’s objectives. Phase II awards are 
larger, averaging about US$ 750,000. These awards are for the firm to undertake and complete 
its proposed research, ideally leading to a commercializable product or process. So-called Phase 
III awards do not come from DoD, but rather from the private sector to the researching company 
to pursue commercialization. Table 1 provides a funding history of DoD’s SBIR Program. 
Table 1. DoD SBIR budgets and awards, by fiscal year a 
Fiscal year Budget (US$ (M)) Phase I awards Phase II awards 
1983 16.70 281 0 
1984 42.79 368 115 
1985 79.00 513 282 
1986 153.00 1031 254 
1987 202.00 1264 401 
1988 221.80 1056 334 
1989 234.40 1021 362 
1990 239.26 1140 415 
1991 233.53 963 318 
1992 241.84 1063 434 
1993 384.82 1285 535 
1994 276.19 1371 417 
1995 445.25 1263 575 
1996 453.46 1372 613 
1997 543.02 1526 639 
1998 553.44 1286 674 
1999 541.31 1393 569 
a Source: http://www.sbirsttr.com/sbirmisc/annrpt.html. 
3. A methodology for evaluating the SBIR Program 
Our methodology for evaluating DoD’s SBIR Program, which can be applied to other programs, 
includes three elements: 
 
1. A broad-based statistical analysis of SBIR recipients. 
2. A case-based investigation of recipients regarding the impacts associated with SBIR awards. 
3. A case-based investigation of the social rate of return from SBIR-funded research. 
Data limitations associated with the SBIR Program, as well as with most public/private 
partnerships, and the multi-faceted nature of program evaluation per se, led us to adopt a broad-
based evaluation methodology. Although survey-based information on SBIR recipients is used to 
conduct what some may view as a traditional evaluation exercise (Section 3.1), we are reluctant 
to draw program evaluation conclusions from only that analysis since the respondent sample is 
limited in size and since there is a limited literature to which these econometric findings could be 
compared.11 We have relied on case studies (3.2 and 3.3) to complement our statistical analysis 
and to facilitate asking broader evaluation questions. Of course, case studies are not without their 
limitations including representativeness issues and possible interview biases. However, as a 
whole, our approaches are complementary and our findings are robust, both of which are 
important elements of a systematic evaluation effort. We conclude that DoD’s SBIR Program is 
encouraging commercialization from research that would not have been undertaken without 
SBIR support; and, moreover, it is overcoming reasons for market failure that cause the private 
sector to underinvest in R&D. 
3.1. Innovation and commercialization efforts of SBIR awardees 
As noted above, two of the legislated goals of the SBIR Program are “to stimulate technological 
innovation” and “to increase private sector commercialization of innovations derived from 
federal research and development.” As a first step toward an evaluation of the DoD’s SBIR 
Program, we sought to understand the extent to which innovation and commercialization have 
been achieved among SBIR awardees. This background analysis in and of itself does not 
constitute an evaluation of the SBIR Program, but rather it provides some initial insight into the 
magnitude of the commercialization that occurs, and the characteristics of companies that are 
commercializing SBIR-funded products. 
 
We rely on data collected by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) for a representative 
sample of DoD SBIR awardees.12 The Academy’s mail survey went to a sample of 379 SBIR 
companies that received a Phase II award, since 1992. A total of 232 surveys were returned 
partially or totally completed. The 112 completed surveys with all of the information needed for 
our analysis are analyzed here. 
 
Since, the purpose of this background analysis was to gain a better understanding of the 
commercialization activity that has occurred, we considered a model to explain cross-company 
differences in actual sales realized to date (the survey was administered in early 1999) from the 
technology developed during the DoD-funded Phase II project (ActSales).13 Thus, our model is 
 
where the subscript i indexes each awardee company and the vector Xi contains company-
specific characteristics as described in Table 2. The dependent variable in Eq. (1), ActSales, is 
the actual sales realized to date from the technology developed during the Phase II project, 
measured in dollars. Although the mean of ActSales is US$ 175,021, that reflects the fact that 78 
of the 112 projects reported no sales. For the 34 projects reporting sales, the mean of ActSales is 
US$ 576,539. 
Table 2. Characteristic variables in Eq. (1) (n=112) 
Variables Definition Mean Range S.D. 
AgeBus Age of the company measured in years 11.13 
years 
1–36 7.417 
ExpFounder Equals to one, if the most recent employment of the 
company founder(s) was in another private company as 
opposed to a university or government agency, and zero 
otherwise 
0.786 0/1 0.412 
Revenues Company revenues were reported in ranges: less than US$ 
100,000; US$ 100,000–499,999; US$ 500,000–999,999; 
US$ 1,000,000–4,999,999; US$ 5,000,000–19,999,999; 
and over US$ 20,000,000. The midpoint of each range was 
used with US$ 50,000 defining the midpoint of the lower 
bound and US$ 25,000,000 defining the midpoint of the 
upper bound 
US$ 
5,547,321 
US$ 
50,000–
25,000,000 
7162364 
PhaseII Number of previous Phase II awards 6.01 
awards 
0–81 12.384 
Complete Equals to one, if the current Phase II award is completed, 
and zero otherwise 
0.366 0/1 0.484 
Market Equals to one, if the company has underway or has 
completed a marketing plan, and zero otherwise 
0.589 0/1 0.494 
Active Number of years since the awarding of the most recent 
Phase II award 
2.82 years 1–6 1.195 
Electronics Equals to one, if the relevant technology area of the award 
is electronics, and zero otherwise 
0.500 0/1 0.502 
Computer Equals to one, if the relevant technology area of the award 
is computer, information processing, and analysis, and zero 
otherwise 
0.214 0/1 0.412 
Materials Equals to one, if the relevant technology area of the award 
is materials, and zero otherwise 
0.071 0/1 0.259 
Mechanical Equals to one, if the relevant technology area of the award 
is mechanical performance of vehicles, weapons, and 
facilities, and zero otherwise 
0.045 0/1 0.207 
Energy Equals to one, if the relevant technology area of the award 
is energy conservation and use, and zero otherwise 
0.098 0/1 0.299 
Environment Equals to one, if the relevant technology area of the award 
is environment and natural resources, and zero otherwise 
0.045 0/1 0.207 
LifeScience Equals to one, if the relevant technology area of the award 
is life sciences, and zero otherwise 
0.027 0/1 0.162 
FastTrack Equals to one, if the Phase II award was a Fast Track 
award, meaning that outside private-sector funding was 
committed to the project before the SBIR award was made, 
and zero otherwise 
0.161 0/1 0.369 
ProbResponse Probability of response to the original NAS survey (the 
Probit model predicting probability of response used 
variables that were available for 109 of the 112 
observations) 
0.659 0.271–0.998 0.175 
 
One clear implication of these survey data is that SBIR awardees do commercialize products and 
services based on their SBIR-sponsored research. That general finding does show the two stated 
purposes of the SBIR Program noted above—stimulation of socially desirable R&D and 
innovation that would not occur without the SBIR Program and commercialization of the R&D 
results—are met. We turn now with an econometric model to details of the commercialization. 
 
Least-squares analysis is not appropriate for estimating Eq. (1) since the dependent variable is 
truncated at zero.14 Least-squared results do not explicitly use the information about threshold 
effects on sales, and thus, such estimation would predict negative sales for some observations. 
We use the tobit model to estimate Eq. (1); the tobit model can be interpreted as predicting a 
measure of the value of sales from the SBIR project. If the predicted value is positive, then the 
company commercializes a product or service and then has sales; otherwise, sales are zero. The 
results for the tobit estimations are in Table 3.15 
 
Table 3. Estimated tobit results from Eq. (1) (asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses) 
Variable Estimated coefficient Estimated coefficient 
Intercept −2310466 (−3.161)*** −1406461 (−1.292) 
AgeBus −13045.5 (−0.457) −11542.7 (−0.419) 
ExpFounder −43146.1 (−0.127) 11598.1 (0.034) 
Revenues 0.0532968 (2.250)** 0.0432694 (1.760)* 
Phase II −7401.9 (−0.521) −6718.9 (−0.476) 
Complete 707243.6 (2.117)** 536615.9 (1.583) 
Market 1147888 (3.082)*** 1171060 (3.213)*** 
Active 62991.5 (0.414) 29066.1 (0.178) 
Computer 654036.6 (1.801)* 597507.1 (1.660)* 
Materials 849108.7 (1.773)* 899354.4 (1.884)* 
Energy 379947.9 (0.769) 254938.4 (0.519) 
Environment 919731.2 (1.710)* 821494.6 (1.555) 
LifeScience 124461.1 (0.165) 20594.2 (0.028) 
FastTrack −82285.4 (−0.213) 2868.0 (0.007) 
ProbResponse – −1078063 (−1.134) 
Log likelihood −540.98 −539.41 
χ2 41.95 (13)*** 43.15 (14)*** 
n d.f. 112 109 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
The tobit results in column (2) of Table 3 lead us to conclude that companies are indeed 
commercializing products from their SBIR projects. Those that have done so to date are the 
larger companies in the computer technology area, materials technology area, and environmental 
technology area that have both completed their Phase II research as well as have formulated a 
marketing plan.16 The specification reported in column (3) includes an additional explanatory 
variable, ProbResponse. If the probability of responding to the NAS survey is associated with 
actual sales (ActSales), and if that response effect in the error term is correlated with the 
variables included in X, the estimates in column (2) of Table 3 could be biased, hence, the 
inclusion of the variable ProbResponse.17 
 
Using the tobit models in Table 3, we estimated for each project the expected value of sales 
conditional on the tobit index function being greater than zero (and hence, conditional on the 
realized sales being greater than zero). Formally, we estimate the conditional mean of the tobit 
index function in the positive part of its distribution for each observation. The average of these 
conditional means is US$ 603,231 for the specification without the control for response bias and 
US$ 598,698 for the specification with the control.18 Estimating the expected sales for each 
observation given Xi (that is, the probability weighted sum of the outcome of US$ 0 of sales as 
well as the positive outcomes), we find on average for all of the observations the expected sales 
are US$ 217,267 for the specification without control for response bias and US$ 223,244 for the 
specification with the control.19 
 
These findings, along with case-based information that in the absence of SBIR support the SBIR 
firms would not have pursued Phase II research or would have pursued it on a very limited scale, 
lend support for our preliminary conclusion that the program is meeting two of its stated goals.20 
We reach these conclusions based on our interpretation of the statistically significant tobit 
coefficients and models. 
 
However, because two program goals are being met, in total or in part, is in our opinion 
insufficient information upon which to base even a preliminary economic evaluation of the 
overall program. What must be shown is that companies would not have undertaken the research 
on their own because of insufficient private returns and that SBIR funding overcomes market 
failures benefiting society with a large social return. In the following two sections, we, therefore, 
add two more elements of evaluation. We use case studies to show that the SBIR Program 
encourages new entrepreneurs, actually changing the career paths of some researchers and 
bringing their talents and ideas into the commercial world. Then, additional case studies are used 
to demonstrate the large social return from the projects that are made possible by the SBIR 
Program. 
 
3.2. Entrepreneurial behavior and the SBIR Program 
To develop information about the extent to which the SBIR Program changes the behavior of 
knowledge workers and thereby helps to create a science-based entrepreneurial economy, 
Audretsch et al. (2000b) use case studies along with responses to a survey of a broader sample of 
firms with SBIR projects. Although the authors emphasize that their results are exploratory and 
based on a small sample, their results do show that the SBIR Program has influenced the career 
paths of scientists and engineers by facilitating the startup of new firms. Additionally, the 
experience of those knowledge workers in commercializing products and services with a small 
business has had a spillover effect by influencing the career trajectories of their colleagues. 
 
Audretsch et al. report that both their survey and their case studies provide consistent evidence 
that: 
 
1. A significant number of the firms would not have been started in the absence of the SBIR 
Program. 
2. A significant number of the scientists and engineers would not have become involved in the 
commercialization process in the absence of the SBIR Program. 
3. A significant number of other firms are started because of the demonstration effect by the 
efforts of scientists to commercialize knowledge. 
4. As a result of the demonstration effect of SBIR funded commercialization, a number of other 
scientists alter their careers to include commercialization efforts. 
Especially for scientists and engineers without previous experience with knowledge-based small 
firms, the SBIR Program appears to encourage the development of knowledge about 
commercialization possibilities and facilitate commercialization from research-based knowledge. 
3.3. Estimating social returns from SBIR-supported projects 
3.3.1. Conceptual framework for analysis 
It is well known that risk and the closely related difficulties of appropriating return to 
investments in technology—R&D specifically—will lead to a divergence between private and 
social benefits. The social rate of return will be greater than the private rate of return as 
illustrated in Fig. 1.21 The purpose of this simple heuristic device is to characterize private 
sector projects with returns not only less than the expected social returns but also less than the 
private hurdle rate for projects normally undertaken by the firm. In those cases, the divergence of 
private from social returns can imply the market failure of private underinvestment in socially 
desirable R&D. 
 
Fig. 1. Gap between social and private rates of return to R&D projects. 
The social rate of return is measured on the vertical axis of Fig. 1 along with society’s hurdle rate 
on investments in R&D. The private rate of return is measured on the horizontal axis along with 
the private hurdle rate on investments in R&D. A 45° line (dashed line) is imposed on the figure 
to emphasize that for the projects depicted the social rate of return from an R&D investment 
exceeds the private rate of return from that same investment. The three illustrative projects 
discussed below are labeled as project A, B, and C. 
 
For project C, the private rate of return exceeds the private hurdle rate, and the social rate of 
return exceeds the social hurdle rate. The gap (short vertical double arrow line) between the 
social and private rates of return reflects the spillover benefits to society from the private 
investment. However, the inability of the private sector to appropriate all benefits from its 
investment is not so great as to prevent the project from being adequately funded by the private 
firm. Hence, it is not a candidate for public support. 
 
Consider projects A and B. The gap between social and private returns is larger than in the case 
of project C; neither project will be adequately funded by the private firm. To address this 
market failure the government has two alternative policy mechanisms. It can use a tax policy to 
address the private underinvestment in R&D or it can rely on public/private partnerships as a 
direct funding mechanism. 
 
If the private return to project B is less than the private hurdle rate because of the risk and 
uncertainty associated with R&D in general, then tax policy may be the appropriate policy 
mechanism to overcome this underinvestment. Risk is inherent in a technology-based market, 
and there will be certain projects for which the rewards from successful innovation are too low 
for private investments to be justified. Tax policy, such as the R&E tax credit, may in these 
situations reduce the private marginal cost of R&D sufficiently to provide an incentive for the 
project to be undertaken privately. For projects like project B, a tax credit may be sufficient to 
increase the expected return so that the firm views the post-tax credit private return to be 
sufficient for the project to be funded. 
 
However, for projects like project A, a tax credit may be insufficient to increase the expected 
return enough to induce the private firm to undertake the project. Such projects could include for 
example projects expected to yield an innovative product that would be part of a larger system of 
products. Even if technically successful there might be substantial risk that the product would not 
interoperate or be compatible with other emerging products, and direct funding rather than a tax 
credit may be the appropriate policy mechanism to stimulate socially desirable investments in 
systems. 
 
A priori, it is difficult to generalize about the way that any one firm’s under-funded projects will 
be distributed in the area to the left of the firm’s private hurdle rate. However, some 
generalizations can be made about the portfolio of private sector firms’ projects in general. For 
those R&D projects, like project B, for which the firm will appropriate some returns but for 
which the overall expected return is slightly too low, a tax credit may be sufficient to increase the 
expected return to the point that the expected return exceeds the private hurdle rate. Such 
projects may be of a product or process development nature and are likely to be a part of the 
firm’s ongoing R&D portfolio of projects. For those R&D projects, like project A, for which the 
firm has little ability to appropriate returns even if the marginal cost of the project is reduced 
through an R&E tax credit, the firm may not respond to such a tax policy but may respond to a 
direct funding policy mechanism. Such projects may be of a generic or fundamental technology 
nature, that is technology from which subsequent market applications are derived and that enable 
downstream applied R&D to be undertaken successfully. Thus, the economic rationale for 
public/private partnerships is that such partnerships represent one direct-funding R&D policy 
appropriate to overcome market failure and that they are more likely to be necessary, compared 
to fiscal tax incentives, when the R&D is generic or fundamental in nature. 
 
Drawing upon the foregoing arguments, we maintain that a candidate project for SBIR awards is 
one like project A in Fig. 1. That is, given that the proposed research aligns with the technology 
mission of DoD, SBIR should fund such projects for which there is a significant potential social 
benefit but also that are characterized by substantial downside risk such that the firm’s expected 
private return is well below its private hurdle rate. 
 
Case-study information reported by Link (2000) and Scott (2000a) confirms for a small sample 
of SBIR-supported projects that not only are the firms’ private returns less than their private 
hurdle rates but also that outside investors are unwilling to sponsor fully the research because of 
both technical and market risk. Hence, at the outset of an SBIR project, not only is a firm’s 
private hurdle rate not expected to be met, neither is the required return for a third party. In 
conjunction with the evidence presented below that the projects have high social returns, the 
findings support the belief that the SBIR Program corrects the market failure of underinvestment 
in socially-valuable research in emerging technologies. 
 
3.3.2. Preliminary estimates of social returns 
Link and Scott (2000) interviewed SBIR award recipients for 44 projects in 43 companies for 
this part of the evaluation study. Each was interviewed toward the end of its Phase II award 
period. Information collected made possible the calculation of a lower-bound of the prospective 
expected social rate of return associated with each project and a comparison of that expected 
social rate of return to both the expected private rate of return to the firm had it pursued the 
project in the absence of SBIR support and the private rate of return expected by the firm with its 
SBIR support. The analysis clearly indicates that SBIR is funding projects like project A in Fig. 
1, and given such funding the projects have become similar to project C. 
 
The sample of projects studied may not be statistically representative of all projects funded by 
SBIR. To make such a claim, all would have to be interviewed to obtain information similar to 
the information collected. This was not done because of resource constraints and the availability 
of SBIR staff to identify specific individuals to be interviewed and to make initial contacts. Thus, 
the sample of 44 projects is simply one sample, and the findings are not necessarily 
representative of all SBIR projects. However, because the findings are strong, and because the 
anecdotal information obtained from SBIR staff indicates the sample was a reasonable cross-
section of funded companies, we are comfortable generalizing to some degree about the findings. 
In any event, the methodology of Link and Scott (2001) is sufficiently general to be applied to 
other samples.22 
 
Table 4 lists the variables required for the implementation of the model. As noted in the table, 
data on selected variables were independently available from DoD project files, but all such 
information was also verified during the interview process and corrected when discrepancies 
were found. Descriptive statistics for these variables are in Table 5. 
Table 4. Variables for the prospective expected social rate of return calculations 
Variable Definition Source 
d Duration of the SBIR project DoD files, verified and updated as 
necessary during interviews 
C Total cost of the SBIR project DoD files, verified and updated as 
necessary during interviews 
A SBIR funding DoD files, verified and updated as 
necessary during interviews 
r Private hurdle rate Interview 
z Duration of the extra period of 
development beyond Phase II 
Interview 
F Additional cost for the extra period of 
development a 
Interview 
T Life of the commercialized technology Interview 
ν Proportion of value appropriated Interview 
L Lower bound for expected annual 
private return to the SBIR firm 
Derived 
U Upper bound for expected annual 
private return to the SBIR firm 
Derived 
a The additional costs considered were research and development costs and not the costs 
associated with searching for or negotiating with venture capitalists. See Gans and Stern (2000). 
 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics on variables used in the social rate of return model (n=44) 
Variable Mean Range S.D. 
d 2.68 years 2–3.5 0.36 
C US$ 1,027,199 US$ 448,000–3,450,000 461901 
A US$ 782,000 US$ 448,000–1,099,966 127371 
r 0.33 0.2–0.5a 0.08 
z 1.30 years −0.375–5.0b 1.07 
F US$ 1,377,341 US$ 0–15,000,000 2972266 
T 10.56 years 1–30c 7.23 
ν 0.16 0.0045–0.60 0.16 
L US$ 902,738 US$ 34,842.6–5,300,500 1228850 
U US$ 1,893,001 US$ 258,830–8,666,330 1733581 
a Eight of the respondents were uncomfortable estimating the private hurdle rate that outside 
financiers would apply to their projects at their outset. For those, the average value of r for the 
respondents in their region was used in the calculations. 
b One observation for z has a negative value because commercial returns started before the end 
of Phase II. 
c One respondent reported that T would be several decades, and another reported that T would be 
forever. In both cases, T was conservatively entered as the value 30 years. However, because the 
relevant discount rates are so high, the difference between 30 years and “forever” is not 
significant. In the integrals in the mathematical model, the term with T entered negatively as an 
exponent would become zero, but with a large value of T the term is very small in any case. 
Phases I and II values for project duration, total cost, and SBIR funding, were combined into one 
value to cover both Phases I and II of the project. That is, each project is viewed from the time 
that Phase I began, and expectations from that point forward are estimated. It is at that point in 
time that the market failure issues discussed above are especially relevant. Respondents reported 
the additional period of time beyond the expected completion of Phase II until the research 
would be commercialized and the additional cost required during that period. 
 
The variable ν, the proportion of value appropriated, deserves some explanation. Firms cannot 
reasonably expect to appropriate all of the value created by their research and subsequent 
innovations. First, the innovations will generate consumer surplus that no firm will appropriate, 
but that society will value. Link and Scott ignore consumer surplus in the calculations of the 
prospective expected social returns thus motivating the claim that the estimates are lower-bound 
estimates. Second, some of the profits generated by the innovations will be captured by other 
firms. Larger firms, for example, will observe the innovation and will successfully introduce 
imitations. Each respondent as part of the interview process was asked to estimate the proportion 
of the returns to producers (themselves and other firms) generated by their anticipated innovation 
that they expect to capture. Then, in an extended conversation, other possible applications of the 
technology developed during the SBIR project were explored. Each respondent was asked to 
estimate the multiplier to get from the profit stream generated by the immediate applications of 
the SBIR project to the stream of profits generated in the broader applications markets—beyond 
the applications to be made by the SBIR firm—that would reasonably be anticipated. We 
calculated ν as the product of two proportions. The first is the proportion anticipated by the SBIR 
firm of the profits from the development and commercialization of the specific applications it 
planned for the technology being developed. The second is the proportion of profits from all 
possible applications—including those beyond the applications that the SBIR firm anticipated 
making itself—taken by the respondent’s planned applications of the generic technology being 
researched and developed in the SBIR project. Thus, ν is the total proportion of the value of the 
technology appropriable by the researching firm. For example, if an SBIR firm anticipated 
appropriating 50% of the profits generated by its planned types of applications of its SBIR 
technology, and if the profits from the types of applications planned by the SBIR firm were 
expected to be 50% of the profits from all applications of the technology, then the SBIR firm 
would expect to earn 50% of a profit stream that itself was 50% of the total profit stream 
attributable to the SBIR generated technology. The firm, therefore, would anticipate 
appropriating 25% of the profits generated by its SBIR project. 
 
Link and Scott then find the lower bound for the annual private return to an SBIR-sponsored 
project by solving their investment model for the amount that the private firm must earn to meet 
its private hurdle rate, or its required rate of return, on the portion of the total investment that the 
firm must finance.23 The firm would not invest in the SBIR project on its own unless it expected 
at least that lower bound for the annual private return on its investment. 
 
To determine the upper bound for the annual private return, the investment model is solved for 
the expected annual return that if exceeded would imply that the expected rate of return earned 
by the private firm would be greater than its hurdle rate in the absence of SBIR support, and 
therefore, SBIR support would not be required for the project. 
 
Sequentially, Link and Scott estimate the average expected annual private return to the firm as 
the average of the upper and lower bounds, U and L. Knowing the average expected annual 
private return is ((L+U)/2) and knowing the portion of producer surplus that is appropriable, ν, 
then total producer surplus equals ((L+U)/2ν). This value for total producer surplus is a lower 
bound for the expected annual social return. Again, it is a lower bound because consumer surplus 
has not been measured. 
 
The expected private rate of return without SBIR support is the solution for the internal rate of 
return—the rate of return that just equates the present value of the expected annual private return 
to the firm to the present value of research and post-research commercialization costs to the firm 
in the absence of SBIR funding. 
 
Finally, the lower bound on the social rate of return is found by solving the investment model for 
the internal rate of return with the average expected annual private return ((L+U)/2), replaced 
with the lower bound for the average expected annual social return ((L+U)/2ν). 
 
The investment model was estimated for each of the 44 SBIR-sponsored projects. Mean values 
of the two resulting important rates of return, averaged across the 44 projects, are shown in Table 
6. There are two important points to be seen in Table 6. First, the average of the expected private 
rate of return in the absence of SBIR support is 25%, clearly less than the average self-reported 
private hurdle rate of 33% (see Table 5). Thus, in the absence of SBIR support the sample of 
firms would not have undertaken the research, and in fact each of the sampled firms stated that 
explicitly during the interviews. Further, the expected social rate of return (lower bound) 
associated with SBIR funding of these projects is at least 84%, and hence, the projects are 
expected to be socially valuable. 
Table 6. Rates of return for the average SBIR project (n=44) 
Variable Definition 
iprivate = 0.25 Expected private rate of return without SBIR funding 
isocial = 0.84 Lower bound for expected social rate of return 
We cannot conclude that a social rate of return of at least 84% is “good” or “bad,” or “better” or 
“worse” than expected. However, we can compare the estimate of the lower bound of the social 
rate of return to the opportunity cost of public funds promulgated by the US Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB). Following the guidelines set forth by OMB (1992) mandating 
a real discount rate of 7% for constant-dollar benefit-to-cost analyses of proposed investments 
and regulations, clearly a nominal social rate of return of 84% is above that rate and thus, reflects 
projects that are socially worthwhile in terms of the OMB standard.24 
 
The expected private rate of return with SBIR support for each of the 44 projects can be 
calculated as the solution for the internal rate of return in the investment model given the actual 
time series of private investments and private returns. The estimated private rate of return with 
SBIR support averages 76% for the 44 cases, this value is noticeably above the average private 
hurdle rate of 33%. However, there is no way for the SBIR Program to have calculated the 
optimal level of funding for these 44 projects, or for any projects, unless, as part of the Phase I 
application all relevant data, including hurdle rates, could have been assessed. In the absence of 
such information, which in practice would be difficult to obtain because of, if nothing else, self-
serving reporting by proposers, the funding implemented by the SBIR Program may be as close 
to optimal as possible.25 
 
Fig. 2 summarizes the estimated values for the average SBIR-sponsored project. Based on the 
sample of 44 projects, the average gap between the lower-bound social rate of return and the 
estimated private rate of return without SBIR funding support is 59%. 
 
Fig. 2. Gap between social and private rates of return to the average SBIR project, n=44. 
Two points need to be emphasized, along with our previous comments about the statistical 
representativeness of the sample of 44 companies. First, the social rates of return estimated for 
the SBIR projects are very conservative, lower-bound estimates because they do not include 
consumer surplus in the benefit stream. Second, some might be skeptical about the SBIR 
awardees’ earnest belief that without SBIR funding the projects would not have been undertaken 
or at least would not have been undertaken to the same extent or with the same speed. With the 
SBIR Program in place, certainly the pursuit of SBIR funding would perhaps be a path of least 
resistance. However, if the research would have occurred without the public funding, the 
estimated upper bound and (hence the average of the upper and lower bounds for the expected 
private returns) would be too low, and the actual lower bounds for the social rates of return 
would be even higher than estimated. Further, the gap would remain, although that would not in 
itself necessarily justify the public funding of the projects. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Based on our three-part evaluation analysis, and the caveats associated with each, there is ample 
evidence to support the conclusion that the net economic benefits associated with DoD’s SBIR 
Program are positive. More specifically, our broad-based statistical analysis of SBIR recipients 
demonstrates that two of the program’s objectives—stimulating technological innovation and 
increasing private sector commercialization of innovations derived from federal research and 
development—are being met. In addition, the case-based analyses demonstrate that the SBIR 
Program redirects the efforts of award recipients toward commercial activity that would not 
otherwise have taken place, and that commercial activity and its attendant spillover effects 
generate substantial positive net social benefits. 
 
Although our conclusions are robust, it is important to emphasize that our analysis is specific to 
DoD’s SBIR Program. Until studies of other agencies’ SBIR programs take place, one should be 
extremely cautious about generalizing from our DoD SBIR findings to the entire SBIR 
Program.26 
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1 See Baldwin and Scott (1987). 
2 While closure on the economic rationale for government policies supporting innovation may be 
at hand, Klette et al. (2000) explain that documenting both market failure and successful 
government programs to overcome it is quite difficult (and when government programs are not 
successful in overcoming market failure there is government failure). Kealey (1997) even 
challenges the conventional wisdom that government support for science is useful. 
3 Martin and Scott (2000) associate various policy mechanisms with sector-specific market 
failures that the mechanisms address. 
4 See Link (1999) for a review of public/private partnerships in the United States. 
5 See Lerner (1999) for a discussion of the appropriateness of the government as a venture 
capitalist through SBIR Programs. See also Lerner and Kegler (2000) for a review of the 
literature related to SBIR Programs. 
6 Tibbetts (1999) provides a history of the development of this program. 
7 As a set aside program, the SBIR Program redirects existing research funds rather than 
appropriating new research funds. 
8 Scott (2000b) shows that the private sector is much less likely to provide funding to DoD 
SBIR-funded projects that are in certain technology areas, in certain geographic regions, or 
minority-owned. Such projects may well address underinvestment, but they could also promote 
diversity as an independent goal in itself. 
9 For an overview of the program, see http://www.acq.osd.mil/sadbu/sbir/overview.html.  
10 An eligible independently owned (at least 51% owned by US citizens) and operated company 
must be for-profit with 500 or fewer employees. 
11 See Lerner and Kegler (2000) for a review of this literature. 
12 These data are described in Cahill (2000). 
13 See Audretsch et al. (2000a) for a preliminary analysis of expected sales. 
14 However, in the present case, the results reported regarding the signs and significance of the 
explanatory variables and the general conclusions about commercialization do obtain in the 
corresponding least-squares regressions. The least-squares results were presented in the earlier 
version of this paper that was presented at the American Economic Association’s meetings, and 
they are available on request from the authors. 
15 The intercept reflects an effect for electronics and mechanical technologies. There are just 
five firms in the mechanical technology area, and a dummy variable for that technology area is a 
perfect predictor for the occurrence of US$ 0 of sales. However, our a priori knowledge of 
projects in that area tells us that the probability of sales is not zero; rather, with just five 
observations, it was happenstance that none of those projects had actual sales. We have included 
these five cases, along with the 56 firms in the electronics technology area, 44 of which have 
US$ 0 in actual sales, in the intercept term. In alternative tobit estimations (available upon 
request from Link or Scott), we deleted these mechanical technology cases from the sample, and 
the qualitative findings (signs and significance and approximate magnitudes) are unchanged. 
16 As shown in Audretsch et al. (2000a), Fast Track projects have higher expected sales, other 
things held equal in an OLS estimation, but those projects did not begin until 1996, and 
therefore, by 1999 they had realized less actual sales than the older projects, although the effect 
is not significant. 
17 There are just 109 observations available for the specification including ProbResponse, 
because three of the 112 observations did not have all of the variables used in the probit model of 
response. We also calculated a response hazard rate but its inclusion in Eq. (1) in place of 
ProbResponse gives results similar to those reported in column (3) of Table 3 (results are not 
reported here but are available upon request from Link or Scott). 
18 There is little qualitative difference between the results when a response hazard rate is 
substituted for the probability of response in the specification. Using the response hazard rate, 
the average of the conditional means is US$ 602,483. 
19 For the specification that replaces the probability of response with the hazard rate, the average 
value of expected sales is US$ 223,450. 
20 See Link (2000), and Scott (2000a) for case-based information that these companies report 
that in the absence of SBIR support they either would not have pursued Phase II research, or 
would have done so on a very limited scale. 
21 A more complete explanation for this figure and for the theoretical model underlying the 
derivation of social and private returns is in Link and Scott (2001). See also Jaffe (1998) for an 
application of a similar figure to the Advanced Technology Program. 
 
22 A complete description of the sample of companies is available upon request. 
23 The theoretical mathematical model is available from either Link or Scott. A complete and 
detailed description of the model, along with an illustrative implementation of it based on project 
data from the Advanced Technology Program is in Link and Scott (2001). 
24 Link and Scott (1998) discuss the use of this guideline for NIST economic impact 
assessments. 
25 Scott (1998) has proposed using a bidding mechanism that, if applied, would result in the 
SBIR funding being just sufficient to ensure that the private participants earn just a normal rate 
of return. The proposal is a novel one, however, it is yet untried. Successful implementation 
would require additional development in order to reduce it to practice. 
26 As these studies take place, by agency, consideration should be given to having matched 
samples of firms, that is firms with and without SBIR support, to obtain comparative evaluation 
estimates of the marginal impact of the program. See Wallsten (2000). 
